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We report here a summary of our recent research on the effect that the race issue, in the 
United States, and the immigration issue in European countries, is having on the degree of 
redistribution and the size of the public sector that is implemented through political 
competition. We model political competition as taking place on a two dimensional policy 
space, where the first issue is the tax rate, or the size of the public sector, and the second 
issue is the race or immigration issue. Our substantive conclusion is that the 
conservative economic agenda has been given new life in many countries because of 
racist and xenophobic views of polities. 
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1.  Introduction 
  
Although it is often assumed by political economists, for modeling purposes, that political 
competition takes place on a unidimensional policy space, reality does not conform to this 
specification.  Politics are surely multi-dimensional, and in the 20th century, it is arguable that 
issues of race, religion, and ethnicity were important ‘secondary’ issues.    Indeed, the issue of 
race has been of paramount important in the United States since its founding, and it has been 
important in democratic competition since the Civil War.   Our interest in the study about which 
we report here is in the effect that the race issue, in the United States, and the immigration issue 
in European countries, is having or can be expected to have on the degree of redistribution and 
the size of the public sector that is implemented through political competition. 
 To see the significance of the effect with which we are concerned, one need only note 
that in the past twenty-five years, a period of sharply rising inequality in the US, the effective 
marginal income tax rate has fallen.  No standard unidimensional model of political competition 
would predict this.  If median income is less than mean income and inequality increases (in the 
sense of an increasing ratio of mean to median income), then, were politics focused upon only 
redistribution and the size of the public sector, tax rates should increase.   The fact that quite the 
opposite has occurred indicates something else is at work: we propose that the most reasonable 
explanation is the effect of the race issue in American politics. 
 The study upon which we report here ( see Lee, Roemer, and Van der Straeten 
(forthcoming)) models political competition as taking place on a two dimensional policy space, 
where the first issue is the tax rate, or the size of the public sector, and the second issue is the race 
or immigration issue.   (The exact specification we choose varies with the country.)  We employ a 
model of political competition which, given data on the distribution of voter preferences, 
produces an equilibrium, as we describe below, in which parties propose policies on the two 
issues.   We then seek to understand how the equilibrium would change if voters were less racist 
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or less xenophobic than they actually are, and in particular, how the equilibrium position of 
parties on the economic issue would change.   We carry out the exercise for the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, and Denmark.   We model only general elections. 
 We conceptualize the effect of the race/immigration issue on the economic issue as the 
sum of two effects.  The anti-solidarity effect (ASE) is the decrease in the size of the public sector 
that occurs because many voters believe that the poor minority is undeserving and is a main 
beneficiary of the welfare state, and so they vote to decrease the size of the public sector.    
Alesina et al (2001, 2004)  have shown, in a cross-sectional panel of countries, that the larger the 
size of the poor minority, the smaller is the public sector, and they allude to the effect we have 
mentioned.  The ASE is a direct effect. 
 On the other hand, in the United States, the equilibrium for the period 1970-1990 can be 
roughly described as follows:  the Republican Party proposed a small public sector, and a 
conservative position on the race issue, while the Democratic Party called for the opposite on 
both issues.    Imagine the decision problem of a fairly poor, racist voter, who would benefit from 
a larger public sector, but who abhors the Democratic position on race: she may vote for the 
Republican Party because of its position on the race issue.  If there are a sufficient number of 
voters of this type, then the Republicans may be able to maintain their conservative position on 
the public sector without losing vote share.     This is an indirect effect of racism on the 
equilibrium on the economic dimension; it is a portfolio effect, because no party existed which 
put forth the position the voter in question might have preferred – a large public sector, and 
conservative on the race issue. 
 Indeed, using the race issue in this way has a name in US politics: it is called the 
Southern Strategy.    After the Civil Rights Movement, racist Southern senators, like Strom 
Thurmond, who had been Democrats, bolted to the Republican Party.   Before these ‘Dixiecrats’ 
decamped from the Democratic Party, it was possible, in the South, to vote both ‘redistributive’ 
and ‘racist’ simultaneously.    Afterwards, it was not – and the Southern white vote gradually 
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moved from the Democratic to Republican parties.  Thus, ironically, the Civil Rights Movement 
may have decreased the degree of redistribution in the United States, by increasing the size of the 
policy bundle effect.     
 Our methodology enables us to decompose the total effect of racist or xenophobic 
preferences on the equilibrium in political competition into these two effects. 
 
2.  The model of political equilibrium 
 The workhorse model of political economy, the Hotelling-Downs model and its median-
voter theorem, cannot be used in our environment, because it fails to possess equilibria when the 
policy space is multi-dimensional.    We use instead the model of party-unanimity Nash 
equilibrium (PUNE) introduced in Roemer (1999, 2001).   
 This model specifies as a data a policy space T, a space of voter types, H,  a utility 
function  which represents the preferences over policies of each type, h in H,  a 
probability distribution, F, of voter types, and the number of parties, n, that shall form.   To 
simplify exposition, let us take n=2.    The model produces, as its output, a set of equilibria, 
where each equilibrium specifies a partition of the set of voter types into two coalitions, A and B,  
,  where one party represents A and the other B,  and a platform for each 
party, .      Thus parties form endogenously, although the number of parties is not 
determined by the equilibrium concept.  We will discuss how we deal with the multiplicity of 
equilibria below. 
:v T H R× →
A∪ B = H , A∩ B = ∅
τ A ∈T ,τ B ∈T
 Parties are organized by political entrepreneurs, and it is postulated that the set of 
entrepreneurs who organize or manage a party consists of politicians with two career strategies – 
those who seek to maximize the parties vote share, and those who seek to defend the interests of 
the party’s constituents.   We call these the Opportunists and the Guardians, respectively.  To 
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define their behavior precisely, we proceed as follows.   For any pair of policies 
, define the set of types who prefer the first policy to the second: (τ 1,τ 2 )∈T × T
  (1.1) Ω(τ 1,τ 2 ) = {h ∈H | v(τ 1,h) > v(τ 2 ,h)}.
The fraction of polity who should vote for  is thus .  Suppose the 
constituency of a party is the coalition 
τ 1 F(Ω(τ 1,τ 2 ))
A ⊂ H .    Then we assume that its Guardians 
attempt to represent A in the sense of maximizing the average welfare of the 
constituency, defined as:  
V A(τ ) = v(τ ,h)dF(h)
h∈A∫  (1.2) 
We then define the partition (A,B) and the policy pair (  to be a party-unanimity Nash 
equilibrium (PUNE) if there exists a pair of numbers  such that: 
τ A ,τ B )
2( , )A Bk k R∈
 
(1)    solves the program  τ A maxT F(Ω(τ ,τ
B ))
s.t.   V A (τ ) ≥ k A
(2)  solves the program ,  τ B maxT F(Ω(τ ,τ
A ))
s.t.   V B (τ ) ≥ k B
and 
(3) . 
h ∈A⇒ v(τ A,h) ≥ v(τ B,h)
h ∈B⇒ v(τ B,h) ≥ v(τ A,h)
 
Condition (1) states that, facing the proposal , the Opportunists and Guardians of party A have 
‘bargained’ to response , and that facing the proposal , the Opportunists and Guardians in 
party B have bargained to a response which happens to be .      Condition (3) determines the 
τ B
τ A τ A
τ B
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partition of the polity into the two coalitions which the party represents; it says that every type is 
happy with the party to which it belongs. 
 This equilibrium concept is a kind of Nash equilibrium – where each party plays a best 
response to the other party – but ‘best response’ is not achieved by maximizing a single payoff 
function; rather, it is the outcome of bargaining between factions with the party players.   
 One might expect that if there is one PUNE, there are many, and this is indeed the case.   
The number kA  can be thought of as modeling the relative bargaining power of the 
Guardians in party A vis-à-vis the Opportunists.  The missing data of the problem, as it 
were, are these bargaining powers.    In the applications that we report here, we always  
compute a two-dimensional manifold of PUNEs, parameterized by the a set of pairs 
 that lies in (k A ,k B ) 2R .  
 It is the idea of modeling the parties as consisting of factions that gives us 
equilibria on the multi-dimensional policy space.   From the mathematical viewpoint, the 
game described is a Nash game played between players with incomplete preference 
orders on T × T .   For more discussion, see Roemer (2001, Chapter 8). 
 
3.  The United States the United Kingdom 
 The data of our problem are (n,T , H ,F,v) .   For these two countries, we define 
policies as a pair (t,r), where t is the tax rate and r is the party’s position on the race issue.   
A type is an ordered pair (w,ρ) where w is the voter’s wage rate, and ρ is his or her 
position on the race or immigration issue.   The utility function is taken to be: 
 v(t,r;w,ρ) = log((1− t)wL + b(t)) + β log(λ − L)− γ
2
(r − ρ)2 + (δ0 −δ2ρ)E(t)  (1.3) 
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where L is labor supply,  b(t) is the value of the lumpsum transfer payment engendered 
by the linear tax rate, and  E(t) is a measure of the degree of equality in the post-fisc 
distribution of income, taken to be the ratio of the post-fisc incomes of the families at the 
25th and 75th centiles of the wage distribution1.    Thus the voter has a conventional Cobb-
Douglas utility function over income and leisure, a Euclidean function on the race issue 
with an ideal policy of r = ρ , and a preference for equality, ceteris paribus.    The 
parameters of the utility function, assumed to be invariant over the polity, are given by 
the vector Ρ = (β,λ,γ ,δ0 ,δ2 ) .   We estimate β  and λ  from existing labor-supply 
elasticity estimates.  Note that if δ2 > 0 , then a voter who is more racist (i.e., larger value 
of ρ ) will care less about post-fisc equality.   This is how we model the anti-solidarity 
effect.   
 We estimate the distribution of types income/consumption surveys and election 
studies from these countries; the latter in particular pose many questions about the 
respondent’s view on the race issue and other issues.  Some care must be taken to define 
‘racism;’ we use several techniques to separate out racism from other attitudes that may 
be correlated with it.  We should emphasize that we do not attempt in our work to inquire 
into the possible justifications of views on the race and immigration questions.  Ours is a 
positive study of how these views affect political equilibrium.   Thus, ‘racism’ and 
‘xenophobia’ may not be the most accurate nomenclature for the views that we measure. 
  Given a choice of the parameter vector (γ ,δ0 ,δ2 ) , we can now compute PUNEs.   
We indeed find many of them, as predicted by the theory.    It turns out that, for the US 
                                                 
1 Readers may wonder why we model a progressive income-tax regime with an affine 
tax.  Empirically, the graph of post-fisc income against pre-fisc income for these 
countries is virtually a straight line. 
 8 
and UK, the PUNEs are quite highly concentrated in the policy space.  We now calibrate 
the model for the election in question  – that is, we choose the vector (γ ,δ0 ,δ2 )  -- to 
deliver PUNEs that give vote shares close to what was observed in the election, and party 
platforms close to what was observed.   The model performs quite well.    To summarize 
the outcome of an election, according to the model, we take the vote-share-weighted 
average of the two party policies in a PUNE, and then average these over all PUNEs 
computed.    For a particular election, call this average platform (t , r ) . 
 We indeed estimate the parameter δ2  to be positive. 
 We now perform two counterfactual experiments: 
 
Experiment 1.  We conduct a counterfactual election where the only issue is tax policy.   
Thus we restrict the policy space to be T* = [0,1] .   The space of voter types is, however, 
unchanged.   We compute the average PUNE for this election.   Denote it by tI .   Note 
there will be no policy-bundle effect in this election – there is no reason for a racist voter 
to vote for the R party in the US because he likes R’s position on the race issue, because 
neither party puts forth a position on the race issue!   However, the anti-solidarity effect 
will still exist: voters who believe that blacks are living off the welfare state may still 
vote for a low tax rate on that account.   Thus, we take the difference tI − t  to estimate 
the policy-bundle effect. 
 
Experiment 2.   We again run a counterfactual election on the tax rate dimension alone,  
but this time we set δ2 = 0 .    The results of this election will be purged of both the 
policy-bundle and the anti-solidarity effects.   Denote the average PUNE  by tII .    We 
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thus define the total effect of racism as tII − t  and the ASE as the difference between this 
number and the PBE. 
 
Table 1 presents a summary of the results for the US.   We pooled data from adjacent 
pairs of years.   
 
year t  tI  tII  ASE PBE 
1976-80 .29 .37 .47 .10 .08 
1980-84 .35 .40 .46 .05 .05 
1984-88 .31 .37 .47 .06 .10 
1988-92 .29 .32 .43 .10 .04 
 
Table 1.    The US results,  ASE and PBE 
 
For the UK, we performed the computation only for 1997: 
 
year t  tI  tII  ASE PBE 
1997 .33 .40 .51 .11 .07 
Table 2   The UK results, ASE and PBE 
 
In the US, we compute that, for the entire period, the marginal income tax rate would 
have been above 40%, absent racism.   The US fisc would have looked like that of a 
northern European country.  We also estimate a substantial effect of racism in the UK. 
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 There is an interesting result that we report for the US.  Figure 1a illustrates the 
density function of US voter types (in 1984-88) where the horizontal plane is the space 
H; the hyperspace illustrated is the equilibrium separation of types into Democrats and 
Republicans (the D’s are below the hyperspace).  The two ‘hills’ in the density function 
correspond to blacks and whites.  Note that, except for small wage rates, the separating 
‘hyperplane’ is virtually orthogonal to the ρ axis.  This implies that US politics in this 
period were race politics, in the sense that, except for low wage workers, one need only 
know the individual’s position on race to predict how he or she would vote.  Figure 1b 
illustrates the partition into Democrats and Republicans in the first counterfactual 
election: now, the separating hyperplane is mainly orthogonal to the w axis.   Thus,  were 
it not for the race issue,  we predict that the US would be characterized largely  by class 
politics. 
 
4.  France and Denmark 
 We chose to study France because of Le Pen’s National Front, one of the most 
highly developed anti-immigrant movements in Europe, and Denmark, because it is the 
first of the Nordic social democracies in which a right-wing government won power (in 
2001), apparently because of the immigration issue. 
 
 For these two countries, we did not possess the highly articulated data needed to 
calibrate the utility function we used for the US and UK, and so we used a simpler utility 
function: 
v(t,r;π ,ρ) = −(t − π )2 − γ
2
(r − ρ)2 . (1.4) 
 11 
Here, r and ρ are as above, but π is now the voter’s view on the optimal size of the public 
sector (rather than his wage), and t is the party’s position on that size.    
 France has many active political parties; we believe they can be 
adequately represented by a Left (the Socialists, Communists, etc.), a Right (the 
Conservative party of Chirac), and an Extreme Right (the National Front).  For France,  
we chose n=3, because the Le Pen party is idiosyncratic, in the sense that, while it 
proposes a position on r to the right of the other two parties, its position on t is in the 
center.    On the other hand, in Denmark there are eleven active parties; however, their 
positions on the public-sector and immigration issue are perfectly rank- correlated, so we 
felt that little would be lost by postulating two parties, a generic Left and generic Right.
 For the utility function (4), we have only one parameter, the salience γ.     We 
cannot expect this model to perform as well as the more highly articulated one associated 
with utility function (3).   Because of the simpler utility function, we are now able to 
compute hundreds of PUNEs, and we choose among them by targeting the vote shares 
predicted in equilibrium to observed vote shares.    We calibrate γ for each year by a 
variety of methods.   
 We indeed observe that in both countries, there is a strong negative correlation 
between π  and ρ  in the polity.   We estimate the distribution of voter types as a bivariate 
normal.  
The separation of the total effect of xenophobia into the ASE and the PBE is less 
straightforward here than in the model of section 3.   By econometric methods, and using 
the voter survey data, we estimate a racism-free distribution of views on pubic-sector 
size, G: that is, what the distribution of those views would be if voters were less 
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xenophobic.  To compute the PBE, we run Experiment 1, just as above.   But to compute 
the total effect, we run a unidimensional election using the distribution of voter types G.   
There is an inherent identification problem in estimating G,  so we run the experiment for 
several estimates of what that distribution might be. 
We conducted the analysis for several years for each country.  We report, in Table 
3, the results for one year for each. 
 
ctry/yr ASE PBE total/S.D. 
France/2002 .31 -.04 27% 
DK/2001 .32 -.06 29% 
 
 Table 3   The ASE and PBE for France and Denmark 
 
 Recall that the equilibrium economic policies are not tax rates, but positions on 
the distribution of voter views on the optimal size of the public sector, which are coded in 
a qualitative way in the questionnaires.    We therefore report in Table 3 the total 
deviation in the equilibrium size of the public sector as a fraction of the standard 
deviation of the actual distribution of those views.   For both countries, we estimate that 
anti-immigrant feeling reduces the size of the public sector by approximately one-fourth 
of one standard deviation from what it would otherwise be.    The PBE appears to be 
almost insignificant, but the ASE is substantial.    For France, this result is not surprising, 
for an anti-immigrant voter who votes for Le Pen does not vote for a small public sector – 
we noted above that Le Pen’s party proposes a centrist view on public-sector size.    For 
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Denmark, it is somewhat more surprising that the PBE is so small.   As we said, we are 
less confident of the results with this model, because of the very simple utility function. 
 Finally we note how our model can describe interesting changes in political 
behavior over time.   In Figures 2a and 2b, we present the partition of the space of voter 
types in France into the three party constituencies, as predicted by the model, in 1988 and 
2002.  The space is (π ,ρ) : larger π means a larger public sector, larger ρ means more 
anti-immigrant.   Notice that in 1988, to predict whether a voter chooses to vote Extreme 
Right, one needs to his position on both issues.  However, by 2002,  it suffices to know 
his position on the immigration issue: in that year, the model predicts that the Extreme 
Right is supported by those and only those voters whose immigrant position is greater 
than 4.5.    Thus, French politics appear to have become polarized around the 
immigration issue during this period. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 There are many caveats to our analysis.  It would be desirable to classify voters as 
having different values of the salience parameter: but that would require a three-
dimensional type space.   It would also be desirable to be able to distinguish between 
public sector policies in general, and policies towards immigrants in particular: but that 
would require a three-dimensional policy space.   In other words, there are limitations to 
the  model we have estimated.   A (3,3) model would be better – 
but using it would require better data sets and much longer computation time.  (Paving 
out the manifold of PUNEs is a computation-intensive process, which becomes more so 
as dimensionality of either H or T grows.)   Nevertheless, as we indicated in the 
(dim H ,dimT ) = (2,2)
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introduction, we believe the (2,2) model is a major improvement over the standard (1,1) 
model used in political economy.   
 Our substantive conclusion is that the conservative economic agenda has been 
given new life because of racist and xenophobic views of polities.    It need not be the 
case that ‘secondary issues’ always have this effect.   One can easily imagine that, for 
example, the environmental issue would move equilibrium economic values in a leftward 
direction.  A citizen who is concerned about he environment might vote for a larger 
public sector because one is needed to regulate environmental degradation (the analog to 
the ASE); and a green voter who is relatively conservative on economic policy might 
vote for a Left party because she prefers its position on the environment  (the analog to 
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Figure 1a   The partition of US voter types into parties in the full model 
 
igure 1b  The partition of US voter types into parties in Counterfactual I F
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Figure 2a   France 1988: Partition of voter types into Right, Extreme Right, 
and Left  (reading clockwise) 
 
igure 2b  France, 2002: Partition of voter types into Left, Extreme Right, 
and Right 
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